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III The Politics of Expansion 
The period from July 13 to 20, 1937, saw the decision game of the second 
mobilization, the resultant of which was the decision to dISpatch three 
divisions to North China from withrn Japan Focusmg our attention on how 
each player affected the game, we shall try to identi命severalimportant 
points which will help us to interpret the resultant 
The Game of the Second Mobilization 
July 13 In the moroiog, a telegraphic report by the New 
Commander of the North Chrna Army, Ma1or General Kazuki, reached to 
the Army General Staff and the War Mmistry It instructed that the North 
China Army should force the Hopei-Chahar Political Council to carry out the 
agreement and that, in case of need to use armed forces, the Commander 
would prepare the required disposition of the North China Army together 
with reinforcements so as to crush the Chinese 29th Army at a blow .1
Moreover, thIS positive view anticipated the probable advance to 
Sh1hkiachwan呂 andTehchow in the future.i Ma1or General Kazuki 
undoubtedly began to hold that idea on his way to Tientsin. 3 Another 
mformation of ilegal firing by the Chmese 37th Division reached the Central 
• The first part of this paper appeared in The ]ournol of Socio/ Science (No. 13), 
Social Science Research Institute, International Christian University, 1975, p. 
137 175. ・Thewriter is a Research Fellow of International Relations, Social Science Rese-
arch Institute, International Christian University, Tokyo 
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Headquarters, which had already been informed of the northward movement 
of the massive Chinese Central Army and its affiliated armies on the previous 
day. Such information no doubt encouraged the advocates of drastic 
measures • 
Informed of some maneuvers in the Army General S回fto break the 
agreement, Naval Minister Yonai, before the Cabinet Conference, asked 
Foreign Mmister Hirota to encourage the War Mmister to stick to the local 
settlement, and not to be overridden by those with positive views 5 The War 
Minister understood this. 
Then at the Cabinet Meeting, War Mmister Sugiyama gave an explanation 
of the situat10n: 
On the spot, the Chinese do not sattsfacto口lycarry out the agreement. 
Illegal firings stil contmue. The Central Army has reportedly been 
moving northward Thus, the Nanking Government’s sincerity IS 
doubtful. Also the field army OJI the spot doubts whether Sung Cheh 
yuan smcerely hopes for a peaceful settlement Even if he does, 
anti-Japanese sentiment in the ranks below that of the regimental 
commanders of the 29th Army has grown intense. The Situation will 
• 6 never warrant opt1m1Sm. 
Partly because he had been advised by the Foreign Minister to stick to the 
local settlement, and partly because he himself had never expected such a 
strong wor¥led appraisal from Commander Kazuki: he went on to say that 
Mobilization of troops within Japan will not only make a great impact 
on the rest of the world but would also provide a plausable excuse for a 
Chm田ereaction, so we must be most careful. Although the 
mobilization orders were expected to have been issued today, they are 
t。be呂1ven戸ndi叫 fu』rtherconfim 
Th!S view as supported by Foreign Minister Hirota, who said: 
Yesterday the German Ambassador visited me and conveyed the 
information that the Nanking Government’s policy is to avoid the 
spread of the in口ident So the War Minister’s explanati叩 ISquite 
reasonable' 
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Thus the Inner Cabinet decided to wait for further confirmation of the 
situation, suspending for a while the orders for mobilization. 
M田 nwhile,Ma1or General Kazuki's report not only encouraged those 
10 who wanted pomive me'5ures, but also got the advocates of the 
non expansion policy to maneuver. The War Guidance Section of the Army 
General Staff, backed up by the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, 
presented the semor deciS1on-makers with their opinion that the non-
expansion policy should be strictly maintained and that the Tientsin Army 
u 
should be so instructed as to adhere to this policy Based upon this view, 
"The Guidelmes for Settling the North Chma In口ident”wereformulated at 
8: 00 p.m., includmg the stipulation that, in case of resort to force, prior 
authorization should be reqmred. The "Guidelines＇’were then reported to 
" the Emperor 
How they were formulated deserves careful examination. Any plan, which 
was drafted usually at the section level, was then generally required to be 
submitted to mter-bureau meetings in order to arrive at a consensus before it 
was passed on to the higher levels In the case of ''The Guidelines for Settling 
the North China Incid四 t,"the War Guidance Section, together with the 
Military Affairs Section, tried to limit the number of players involved m the 
game by avoiding the formal procedures which, they feared, would mean the 
1' shelving of the plan. In addition, because the Army senior deciS1on-makers 
felt it urgent at this moment to convey some conS1stent instructions to the 
North Chma Army and had no idea of altering the non expansion policy 
They wanted to get the guidelines decided immediately without any 
disturbance, and so had to exclude from the fmal stage those below the rank 
of diviS1on chief, most of whom were advocates of more drastic measures~＇ 
Then the deciS1on was reported to the Emperor. They naturally thought, it IS 
assumed, that the advocates of stron呂田四sureswould fmd it difficult to 
interfere once the guidelines had been addressed to the Throne. Then after 
the decision had been made as descnbed above, it was cabled to the North 
China Army in the name of the Vice War Minister 
In the meantime, the Kwan tun且Armyhad started action on the evening of 
July 11, and part of it now appeared in Pekmg and another in Tientsin 
The Korean Army also had been activated m the evening two days before'' 
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It was these act10ns that would 1eopardize both local settlement and the non 
expansion policy, as will be later explamed. 
July 14 - Ma1or General Nakajima and Colonel Sh1bayama, each on 
behalf of the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister respectively, 
were ordered to fly to T1entsin m order to ensure that the North China Army 
fully understood the gu1delmes drawn on the prev10us day, to appraise“the 
need for any remforcements, ' and to“prepare a firsthand evaluation of the 
ーー.16s1tuat1on ・ 
Ma1or General Kazuki received a letter from the Emperor dated July 11, 
which read that, deeply concerned about the spread of the Incident, the 
Emperor hoped the Commander would carry out a swift implementat10n of 
the agreement and would not react carelessly to Chi町 seprovocat10n~7 
- July 15ー TheWar Guidance Section submitted to the sections 
concerned the plan of“The Outlines for Gmding the North China Incident＇’ 
drafted on the previous day, and presented it to Ma1or General Ishiwara. The 
plan proposed that: ・
The general policy of non-expansion be firmly mamtamed. For this 
purpose, in case that the Chmese were found to be sincere in 
implementmg the cease-fire agreement, troops should be withdrawn at 
the earliest opportunity Even if the situation should become 
aggravated, the non-expansion policy should stil be maintained In 
case of a need to use force, however, decisive power be used from the 
beginning to bring as early a settlement as possible'.' 
On rece1vmg this plan, Colonel Muto, Chief of the Operations Section, tore 
,19 
It up, saying，“Such an abstract plan is useless！’ Having held extremely 
positive views from the outset of the mc1dent, the Intelh呂田ceDivision of the 
General Staff made the situational appraisal that Japan should settle the 
incident without delay by dispatching the reqmred troops to North Chma as 
soon as possible'" This appraisal was submitted to the sections and divisions 
concerned Thus withm the General Staf, far from being reconciled, conflict 
of opinion was intensified 
" Then m the evenmg, Mr. lshu, Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau, who 
was himself an advocate of non-expansion and had also been influenced by the 
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War Guidance Section, presented the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau with 
a proposal" which stated・ 
1. The Japanese Government shall approve the local agreement of 
July 11; 
2 The Japanese Government shall demand that the Nationalist 
Government immediately cease military activities, 
3. If the Nationalist Government accepts the above stated demand, 
the Japanese Government shall halt further dispatches and also 
immediately withdraw reinforcements, aw副tingimplementat10n of 
the first term; 
4 These terms shall be announced both within and without the 
23 country. 
The chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau succeeded in getting approval for his 
proposal from the chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, and intended to submit 
It to the Cabinet on the following day. 
In the meantime, arriving at Tientsm m the evening, Ma1or General 
Nakajima and Colonel Shibayama commumcated their instructions of July 
13 to Commander Kazuki, saying，“It has been already reported to the 
24 
Emperor." The Commander argued, ＇‘If non expansion was adhered to by 
al means, reinforcements should be restrained m order not to provoke the 
other side.' '25 Major General Naka1ima and Colonel Shibayama said in reply, 
“R目nforcementswill be reconsidered since you deem the present strength of 
the T1回目inArmy to be sufficient "25 Immed旧日lythey tned to send a 
telegram that "no reinforcements need to be sent to North Chma，＇’ but 
Colonel Shibayama was advised by Lt. Colonel Ikeda not to send a cable from 
the Headquarters m Tien 
the Colonel flew to Dairen and sent the tele且ram1n C。de,which仰ever
reached the top decision ma晶e口.As a matter of fact, the telegram was held, 
unreported to the semor decis10n-makers, by an advocate of expansion, a 
certain second lieutenant in charge of telegrams at the Army General Staff in 
Tokyo~＇ 
A part of the 20th Division of the Korean Army had already moved into 
Tientsin by this date, but the remainder was ordered to stay outside for the 
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time being.29 
In Kulmg, Chou En-lai participated in the National Defence Conference as 
an oficial representative of the Communists from this date'° 
July 16ー Inthe mornmg, Br山shCharged' Affairs Dodds met with 
Vice Foreign Mmister Horiuchi, and transmitted orally the informat10n that 
Chiang Kat・shek was "ready to withdraw troops to their positions prior to 
the incident and terminate al troops movemen阻 inthe affected area 1f similar 
" action (was) taken by the Japanese Government." 
Advocates of stron呂田回sureswere gamin呂田日uence Returning from 
China, Ma1or Kawamoto of the Chinese Section of the Army General Staff 
presented his situational report that the non expansion policy was now 
construed by the North China Army as making peace at any cost, and he 
insisted that it was essential to deal demive blow to the Chmese 29th Arml' 
Based upon the positive views of the Operations Section, the Operations 
Division of the Army General S阻fset forth its s山attonaljudgement that, 
while it was necessary to maintain the non-expansion policy, a d回 dlmewas 
to be fixed for the negotiations with the Hopei・Chahar Political Coun口1,and 
that, if no sincerity to negotiate was recognized on the part of the Chinese, 
the root of the conflict in North China should be elimi回目dby chastisiog 
them with force~＇ 
These views had been largely affected by the mformation having reached by 
that time, which reported that the Chinese 29th Army had not withdrawn 
from the left side of the Yungting River and that the Chinese Central Army 
was concentrating in North China~＇ Moreover, the fixi時 ofa deadline for 
the negot1attons was undoubtedly a result of the plan that the North China 
Army was to complete i回 strategicdeployment by July 19. 
Around noon Ma1or General Ushiroku, Chief of the Military Affatrs 
Bureau of the War Mmistry, met with Ishi at the o節目 ofthe Asian Affairs 
Bureau, and consented to the proposal which the chief of Naval Affairs 
Bureau had agreed to on the previous mght. Major General Ushiroku 
returned to the War Ministry, and出entelephoned !shit to say, "The Army 
" has already decided on the policy, so please forget what we’ve talked about：’ 
Given the turning of Situation in favor of the adovacates of forceful measures, 
t was 1mpossぬlefor Ma1or General Ushirol肌
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dissuade the advocates of tough measures in the War Ministry. The proposal 
of the chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau was not to be presented to the Inner 
Cabinet 
In the evening War Minister Sugiyama talked with Maior General Ishiwara 
37 about setting a deadline for the negotiations wtth China Major General 
Ishiwara had not yet given his consent He was waitmg for “Shtbayama’s 
evaluation before 1ssumg any new orders." Colonel Shibayama of the War 
Ministry had not come back from China, so his on砂allywas the War 
Guidance Section who'e chief, Colonel Kawabe, was against settmg a 
38 
deadline for the negotiattons. Adovocates of tough measures, encouraged by 
the information stated above, could argue that China was taking advantage of 
Japan by delaying the negottattons, and thus they were gaining considerable 
influence. Under such conditions, Maior General lsh1wara was urged to 
make up his mind because July 19 was to be the day when the strategic 
deployment of the North China Army would be completed And as the chief 
of the Operations Division, to make no decision implied to miss the 
opportune moment from the strategic pomt of view. 
At about 8・00p m. Premier Konoye discussed with Naval .Minister Yonai 
the questions of a basic settlement of the Chma issue and the sending of 
Foreign Minister Hirota to China. But the Naval Mintster doubted its 
feasibility. 
July 17ー Inthe mornmg, after overnight deliberations, Ma1or 
General Ishiwara complied with the War Mi即日町、 proposal,which was as 
follows 39 
I. To make the Hopei-Chahar Political Council implement the 
following demands by the deadline of the July 19：・
a) A formal apology by Sung Cheh yuan, 
b) The dismissal of the chief of the 37th Division, Feng Chih an, 
and punishment of those responStble for the incident; 
c) W 1thdrawal of the corps from Papaoshan, 
d) Sung Cheh yuan’s signature to the terms of settlement of July 
11. 
2. In case of unfulfilment of these demands by the date fixed above, 
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our army shall break of negotiations and chastise the 29th Army. 
For this purpose, required troops shall be mob1hzed in Japan when 
the time has expired, and dispatched to North China 
3. In case of the implementation of our terms on the part of the 
Chinese after the deadlme, the 29th Army shall be withdrawn to 
the nght side of the Yungtmg River. 
4 In order to limit the issue to North China and thus settle it locally, 
the Impenal Government shall demand of the Nanking Govern-
ment that it withdraw its armies to the prior positions, terminate 
anti-Japanese actions and the mterference with the negotiations on 
the scene" 
At 11: 00 a.m., a Five Mmister Meetmg was held." War Mm1ster 
Sugiyama stated on behalf of the Army that no more delay could be allowed 
for the negotiations between Japan and China due to the lack of sincerity on 
the part of the Chmese, and msisted that July 19 be fixed as a deadline for 
the negotiations both m Nanking and on the spot~＇ Considering the probable 
consequences, Foreign Mimster Hirota firmly expressed his opposition to the 
setting of a deadline for the negotiauons with the Nankmg Government, but 
he did not disapprove the negotiations with a time limit on the spot. He 
further stated that he would try to呂田 anearly reply from the Nanking 
Government to the demand for halting the northward movement of the 
Chmese Central Army." Since both the Naval and the Finance Ministers 
supported the Forei呂nMmister’S view, the War Minister complied Thus 
the above proposal was adopted with the condition that item 1 be left to the 
dIScretion of the North China A口町；~· The Fore唱nMmister's stand, it is 
assumed, was affected not only by the informauon that the Vice Foreign 
Minister had received on the previous day from the British Charge d’Affairs, 
" but also stemmed from his prop四 sityas a career diplomat The War 
Mmister’s stand, on the other hand, undoubtedly was a reflection of the 
atmosphere in favor of strong measures withm the Army. 
The Operat削1SSection, without authorization by Major General Ishiwara, 
asked the M1htary Affairs Sect10n of the War Mimstry to make preparations 
for mobilization The chiefs of both Sections believed that it was necessary to 
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mobilize to strike the Chmese 29th Army in order to prevent the same kind 
of mcident from recurring in the future.46 On the other hand, the War 
Gmdance Section had decided on the use of massive forces m order to attain 
an early settlement over the long term perspective; m case of failure, It 
anticipated an al out war" 
In the m田ntime,Chia時 K剖－shekdel附 redan address at Kuling~＇ After 
his speech, Chiang Kai shek gave d1rections to Y1 Tmg yuan, Sung 
Cheh-yuan’s representative m Peiping, who had been invited, and had him 
49 cable them to Sung Cheh yuan and Chang Tzu-chung 
Receiving the instructions to fix the deadline from the Central 
Headquarters that m且ht,Chief of Staff of the North China Army, Ma1or 
General Hashimoto, thought them quite unsuitable since the Chmese 
ne呂田iatorswere about to make a concession at that very moment. 50 To 
communicate the requests as they were, he feared, would have a drastic effect 
on the Chinese, so the Ma1or General conveyed them m the form of normal 
51 requests. In addition, on his own initiative and responsibility, Major 
General Hashimoto mod出edthe terms to make them more acceptacle to the 
Chinese. For example, the requirement for punishment of Divisional 
Commander Feng Chih an was replaced by that of Regimental Commander 
Chin Chen chung, and so forth. 
In Nankmg, Councilor Hidaka called on Chinese Foreign Minister Wang 
Chung hui at 11: 30 p.m. and strongly requested that, m order to restrict the 
issue to North China, the Nationalist Government withdraw its Central 
;, 
Army moving northward and not mterfere with the negotiations on the spot. 
- July 18 - At 11 ・00 a.m. a Fi Min 
Minister Hirota said’“Unhampered by the development of the incident so 
far, we should negotiate with China, with a view to maintainmg peace based 
upon our vested mterests, the three agreements (the Tangku Truce, 
Umezu Ho司 and Doihara Chin呂 Agreements), respect for territorial 
sovereignty and co prosperity." This was acknowledged by the part1C1pants. 
Then the Prime Minister said，“Why don’t we issue a statement on equal 
opportumty in North China？”The Foreign Mmister was against this as he 
doubted whether it would be advantageous to Japan. Then the Premier 
added，“Why don’t we withdraw the Kwan tung and Korean Armies as soon 
¥ 
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as the incident is settled＞” This time, the War Minister did not agree since 
the future, he said, could not be fully anticipated" At this Conference, the 
focus which had heretofore been on how to settle the issue locally seemed to 
be blurred and shifted. The Foreign Mmister’s ini11a11ve, however, was 
taken as an effort to break through the stalemate of the ne呂otiations. His 
proposal was not inconsistent with what the War Minister had been arguing 
so far, so it was approved. On the other hand, the Premier’s proposal was 
out of the quest旧民 althoughhe seemed to have tried to tap others' Vlews on 
the probability of direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek which he had been 
55 
considering. 
In the deliberations on the mobilization and dispatch of troops, the 
Operauons Secuon presented the Army Affairs Section with its plan 
authorized by Ma1or General lshiwara to the effect that it anticipated an 
all-out war and白川， dependingon the situation, the. decision should be made 
between July 19 and 20 to dispatch. three divisions to North China." 
Major General lshiwara was stil undecided on this question smce he was 
deeply preoccupied by the fear that Japan would become bogged down in a 
total war situation. Therefore he did his utmost to persuade the War and the 
Vice War Ministers, saying: 
30 divisions can be mobilized at present But we can allocate only 15 
of them to China, so total war is 1mpo5Sible However, probability of 
a total war IS very high, if things are left as they are. Consequently, 
we’re at the edge of a bottomless swamp al war, just as Napoleon was 
with the Spanish War Now we should resolutely withdraw al our 
troops to Shanhaikwan, on the border of Manchukuo and China. And 
then Prerruer Konoye himself should fly to Nanking and settle the 
basic issues between Japan and China by having a heart-to-heart talk 
57 wllh Chiang Kai shek 
Then Vice Minister Umezu calmly answered 
We would like to But have you talked about it with the Premier and 
have you made sure of his confidence to carry through negollations? 
Are you going to give up the nghts and interests in North Chma that 
have been acquired so far? And do you think Manchukuo will become 
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stable as a result？” 
Able man that he was, Vice Mmister Umezu looked at the matter not from a 
strategic point of view or a long-term perspective as Ma1or General lshiwara 
did, but rather from the viewpoint of, to quote Hata’s words，“a 
"' bureaucrat who persisted in rationality m any given situation.’ There 
fore, he thought 1t unacceptable to take the chance on the Premier's direct 
negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. To withdraw al the troops would be to 
abandon the interests and righ回mNorth Chma. Above al, he and War 
I羽田1sterSugiyama both doubted whether the Premier had the necessary 
willingness and confidence" Thus, far from successfully persuading them, 
Major General lshiwara was himself hard put to reply. 
In Tientsm, at I: 00 pm Sung Cheh yuan called on the Commander of the 
North China Army, Major General Kazuki, to make an apology, carrymg 
out one of the terms agreed upon on the previous day The vlS!t of Sung 
Cheh手yuan,however, was announced to the Chmese as his welcome v1s1t to 
the new Commander.'1 
July 19ー lnNanking at 2:45 p.m. Tong Tao ning, Chief of the 
Japanese Section of the Asiatic Bureau, called on Councilor Hidaka at the 
Japanese Embassy and handed him this aide mtmotr ・ 
.It is therefore proposed that the two parties jointly fix a definite date 
on which both sides shall simultaneously cease al military movements 
and withdraw their armed forces to the positions occupied prior to the 
incident .. 
，ー theChinese Government is prepared immediately to enter into 
ne呂otiationswith the Japanese Government through regular diploma 
tic channels The settlement of questions of a local nature susceptible 
of adjustment on the spot shall be subject to the sanet1on of the 
Chmese National Government . " 
This reply was clearly based upon Chiang Kai shek’s statement at Kuling on 
July 17. Unsatisfied with this, Coun口lorHidaka mquired“whether it was 
intended as an answer to the Japanese aide-mtmoir of July 17”日 The
youn且Chineseoficial司whohad no authority other than to convey the aide 
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memoir, could not give a satisfactory answer although he implied the hope 
that this oide-memotrwould lead to a peaceful settlement “ 
At 4 00 p.m. Japanese Military Attache Kita called on the Chinese 
Foreign O節目 and asked War Mmister Ho Ying chin to withdraw 
Central Government troops from Hopei, implying that a failure to comply 
with thIS request would result in the breaking of ne呂otiations" The War 
MinISter’s reply was that“that m1h阻ryprecautions taken by the Chinese 
Government (were) for no other purpose than self defense" and that“if 
Japan (withdrew) her newly increased forces from Hopei the Chinese 
ー.66Government would consider making a similar move.” 
At 8: 00 p m. Chiang Kai shek’s address at Kuling on July 17 was 
announced simultaneously at Kul旧g,Nanking and Shanghai. He stated as 
follows: 
.If finally we r田chthe stage where 1t IS impossible to avoid the 
inevitable, then we cannot do otherwise than to resist and to be 
prepared for the supreme sacrifice. 
Whether or not there is the least vestige of any hope for peace 
between Chma and Japan depends upon the action of the Japanese 
Army. Even at the very last second before we abandon al hope of 
peace we would stil be hoping for peace, we would stil be seeking a 
solution through proper diplomatic channels. 
The following four pomts will clearly show what our stand on this 
issue is: first, any kind of settlement must not infringe upon the 
territonal integrity and sovereign rights of our nation, second, the 
status of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council IS fixed by the 
Central Government and we should not allow any ilegal alteration; 
third, we will not agree to the removal by outside pressure of those 
local oficials appointed by the Central Government such as the 
Chairman of the Hopei and Chahar Political Council; and fourth, we 
will not allow any r田町ict1onbeing placed upon the position now held 
by the 29th Army. 
These four points constitute the minimum conditions possible as a 
basis for negotiations for any nation no matter how weak it may be. 67 
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At 10・00pm the Commander of the North China Army announced that 
"the North China Army would take free action after 12 o’clock on July 
20.＇’“ The Chinese firing at Yiwentzushan which resulted m casualties 
among the Japanese officers and mortar fmngs at night provoked the advocates 
of strong steps in the North China Army, and resulted in this demion." 
At 11 :00 p.m. as a consequence of the North China Army’s statement, 
representatives of the 29th Army, Chang Tzu-chung and Chang Yun-yung, 
visited Chief of Staf, Major General Hashimoto, to sign the agreement for 
implementation which called for the prohib山onof anti-Japanese ac回andthe 
suppression of Communist activ山田？
In Tokyo on the other hand, the Intelligence Division of the Army General 
Staff was demanding the use of armed forces. The information of the reply 
from the Chinese Government and of the Chinese fi口ngsat Yiwentzushan, 
helped to converge the divided opinions into a consensus for action. Chiang 
Kai-shek's statement was no doubt exactly what the advocates of drastic 
measures had wanted and turned the balance m their favor That night, even 
the chief of the War Guidance Section, Colonel Kawabe，加dto acknow』dge
71 that it was time for a decision. 
July 20 - At 1.30 am the Foreign Ministry, having been informed 
by Councilor Hidaka of the Chinese Government’s reply on the prev10us 
n唱ht,held a meeting and thereupon announced that 1t was unsmtable as a 
reply to the Japanese Government’s request and that there would be no hope 
for settlement of the issue unless the Nanking Government reflected on her 
actions, since the afair had been aggravated by her interference with the local 
72 settlement and by her dispatching of troops northward. 
In the morning before an emergency Cabinet session, the chiefs of the 
Asian Affairs, Military Affairs, and Naval Affairs Bureaus discussed the 
issue of mobihzatton to formulate a joint policy recommendation for the 
Cabinet. Major General Ush1roku, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, 
insisted that mobilization was inevitable both due to the circumstances in his 
bureau and due to the domestic situatton althou呂hhe himself was against it;' 
The other chiefs were absolutely against it, and no consensus was reached. 
Then Chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau Ishii requested that Foreign Minister 
" Hirota oppose the mobilization proposal 
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At I 0:00 a m. a Cabinet session began. War Mimster Sugiyama requested 
that three divisions from within Japan be immediately dispatched in order to 
assure Chin田esincere implementation of the agreement and to make 
・ '5preparations ready against the Chmese Central Army. The following was 
the discussion among the Cabmet Mimsters 
Foreign Mimster Hirota: In Nanking, Councilor Hidaka is 
negotiating with Forei呂nMinister Wang Chun且hui,so I thmk 
we’d better wait for the reply. I don’t disagree with mobilization, 
though. 
Naval Minister Yonai・Ourbasic principal is the non-expansion policy 
and moreover the agreement has been already signed on the spot. 
So why mobilizationフ
War Mm1ster Sugiyama: . there’s no sign that they would 
,implement the agreement. In addition, Central Army and others are 
concentrating into Pingchin from various areas We are urged to 
dispatch the reinforcements in order to protect our nationals and to 
defend the i目ldarmy. 
Anyway the dispatch of the reinforcements has been already 
acknowledged by the previous Cabmet Council 
Naval Minister Yonai ・ I understand it’s for the purpose of self 
defense. Do you intend to dispatch armed forces, if necessary, to 
Shanghai for self-defense and the protection of nationals? 
War Mmister Sl'g1yama: I know what you m田n We’I consider it 
when that happens But now, as for the North China issue now in 
question, the dispatch of five divisions has been decided upon at the 
previous Cabinet Council. The situation is highly pressin且 Iwould 
like you to leave the time for the dispatch to the judgement of the 
H唱hCommand. It would be irrevocable if we而1sthe time. 
Pnme Mmister Konoye: I know what the War Mimster said. Under 
these conditions, we’d better wait for.the results of the talk between 
Councilor Hidaka and Foreign Mimster Wang Chung hui, though a 
litle awkward. 
76 
War Minister Sugiyama: All right We’I wait 
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Finance Minister Kaya and Communication Minister Nagai supported the 
War Minister. 
In the meantime, Councilor Hidaka visited Foreign Mmister Wang Chung 
hui in the mornin且， andconfirmed that the aide-memoir of July 17 was an 
answer to the Japanese request for “immediate cessation of provocative 
actions " The Foreign Mmister only reiterated the points already explained 
by Tong Tao-ning on the previous day. Then the Councilor emphasized that 
they were too vague and also unsatisfactory." Although at 3 00 p.m. Sung 
Cheh-yuan agreed to withdraw the 37th D1V1s10n to the vicinity of Paoting, 
the Chmese army in the city of Lukowkiao had started firmg at the Kawabe 
Brigade at about 2: 30 p m and the Chinese army at the west side of the 
Yungtmg River concentrated firmgs at Yiwentzushan, causing some 
casualties on the Japanese side. 
At 7う0p m. the Cabinet session was reconvened Informed of the results 
of the Hidaka、Iang talk and the Chinese ilegal firings, the Cabinet Council 
decided on the dispatch of three home divisions to North China on the 
condition that they be immediately demobilized if the situation turned for the 
better after the order was 1日ued."Then at 9: 25 p m. Cabinet Secretary 
Kazami made an announcement to the effect that the Government had 
decided to take proper measures for self-defense accordmg to the prearranged 
79 policy, although no reference was made to mobilization. 
The description presented above has shown us several important points 
which help to explain how the decision for the second mobilization was made 
We shall now deal with them one by one 
First, Commander Kazuki of the North China Army had considerable 
leeway to act on his own way. This was mainly due to the fact that he 
realized that there existed a discrepancy in views between the War Ministry 
and the Army General Staf.80 Therefore, when he heard the July 11th 
Statement in Seoul on his way to T1entsm司 heconsidered that Japan was 
determined to fight with China.81 As he was not well versed concernmg the 
Chma issue, he was very much affected by the so called “Chma experts” 
who advocated drastic measures. 82 In add山on,he viewed the situation not 
llO 
from a long term and stra担・gicpoint of view, but from that of operations and 
tactics m which he thought he had confidence.幻 Andas Commander, he 
wanted to avoid risking the North Chma Army at a time when Chinese 1legal 
firings continued and the Central Army was moving north Thus he sent that 
strong-worded report, which encouraged the advocates of drastic measures m 
Tokyo, and undermined Major General Ishiwara’S position. 
Second, particularly when the decision-markers had difficulty in assessing 
what was呂田ngaway from home, the information from the scene did have great 
influence on them as stated above. In this sense, Colonel Shibayama’s 
telegram, which was deliberately kept unreported to the decision makers by 
the oficial of the Army General Staf, undoubtedly affected the game of 
mobilization m favor of the advocates of a hard line 
Th!Cd, the action of the Chinese Government, i e , the northward 
movement of the Central Army, was of course affected by the July 11th 
Statement of the Japanese Government The dispatch of troops from Japan 
had been cancelled but was not announced. What affected the Chinese 
Government more than anythmg else, however, was the appearance of the 
Kwantung Army in Peiping and Tientsin on July 13 and of the Korean 
Army by July 15 These actions undoubtedly caused the Chinese action, 
" because m。stof the Central Army began to move north rfter July 13 It
was only 2,000 affiliated troops of the Chinese Central Army that had moved 
to Paotin旦fromnorthern Honan by ju砂1.
Fourth, together with these Japanese acuons司 whatalso affected the 
Chinese Government was the distorted information sent before July 16 from 
the Chmese Embassy in Japan, which reported that divisions of "not les 
85 
than 100,000" and munitions had been sent from Japan to China and Kom 
This m白日且eand the above-stated Japanese actions made the position of 
Ch岨n且Kai-shekextremely dificult, particularly after Chou En lai began to 
attend the National Defense Conference on July 15. Now Chian且K出－shek
was pressed for a decision," and he had to avoid the impression that he 
" succumed to Japan. Then he delivered the address at Kuling on July 17, 
which was however directed only to the National Defense Conference, and 
not to the Japanese Government at that time 
Fifth, judging from the Jap即 seactions described above, Chia時 Kaishek 
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naturally considered the Japanese proposal for mutual withdrawal of troops 
unacceptable. However, Chiang Kai-shek personally was to acknowledge the 
agreement on the spot Despite Chiang Kai-shek’s intent10n, Tong Tao-ning, 
young oficial of the Asiatic Bureau, could not convey this nuance to 
Coun口ilorHidaka because he was neither m close touch with Chiang Kai-shek 
nor did he have the discretion to act on his own initiative N目therdid 
Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui who was not close to Chiang Kai-shek 
and was a pro Anglo Amencan Thus, Councilor Hidaka 1udged from their 
replies that China had no intention of negotiating, and reported to Tokyo to 
that effect 
Sixth, due to the stalemate m negotiations on the spot and due to the 
deadline by which deployment of the North Chma Army was scheduled to be 
completed, advocates of drastic measures could demand that the deadline of 
July 19 be fixed for the negotiations. Major General lshiwara was placed in 
an agonizing position HIS aly in the War Ministry, Colonel Shibayama, was 
in T1entsin and, m addition, Shibayama’s request for cancelling the dispatch 
of troops did not reach the Major General Then Ma1or General lsh1wara had 
to approve the fixmg of the deadline for the negotiations from an operational 
point of view. 
He was stil undecided. He believed that he had to avoid the risk of total 
war by al means. Both Prime Minister Konoye and Foreign Minister Hiro阻
tried to fel out the sentiments of other Cabinet即日nistersconcerning the 
negotiations on an over-all adjustment basis, but others considered them to 
be unreliable and doubted their confidence and willingness to carry out 
negotiat旧ns. Therefore, Major General Ishiwara could not persuade Vice 
War Minister Umezu and War Minister Sugiyama to have the Premier 
negotiate directly with Chiang Kai-shek. Then came Hidaka’s telegram, 
which provided the fmal impetus for the de口sionto dispatch three home 
d1V1sions to North China. 
(Continued) 
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北支事変 官僚政治モデルを通して（その二）
〈要約〉
井上真蔵
前稿に於いては1937年7月11日の華北派兵声明が，各プレーヤーの如
何なる立場や利害関係から生じたかを主に分析してきた。また，この華
北派兵という日本政府の行為が内外に与えた影響についても触れてきた。
本稿では，それ以後の第二次動員が如何になされたかという点に焦点
が合わされる。刺激反応相互作用という従来の簡単なモデルによれ
ば， 7月11日の華北派兵声明が中国軍の北上をもたらし，さらに，これ
に対して第二次動員が決定されたと見ることができょう。しかし，より
直接的には以下の官僚政治過程の特徴に十分な注意が払われなければな
らない。
まず，北支軍司令官は 7月13日に強硬意見を中央に具申L，第二次動
員ゲームに影響を与えるが，これは司令官の立場と自由裁量の余地が大
であったという点によっている。彼は参謀本部と陸軍省との判断には相
違があると感じていた。また赴任の途中.11日の声明を知り，日本政府
が内地動員し中国に兵を進める決定をしたものと受けとったのである。
さらに，中国軍の北上が伝えられる情勢の中で，兵力を有利に展開させ
ることが司令官としての任務であった。
第二に，「援軍無用」という柴山軍務課長の電報が参謀本部のー電信員
に握りつぶされたが，これは石原を始めとする動員反対者の立場を弱め，
反対に動員支持者の立場を強化したのであった。これは最も顕著な「官
僚政治」過程の例と云えるであろう。
第三に，前述の華北派兵声明にも増して，中国軍の北上を促したのは，
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7月13日北京，天津に現われた関東軍の存在そのものであると云えよう。
また15日までに朝鮮軍も北京，天津に現われていたのである。すなわち
7月11固までに北上していた中国軍は約2干の中央軍傍系であり，その
他は7月13日以後に北上を開始したからである。
第四に，上述の関東軍や朝鮮軍の行動と共に中国政府に影響を与えた
ものとして，在日中国大使館より 7月16日以前に送られた誤った情報が
挙げられる。それは，約10万の兵と大量の武器弾薬が日本本土より中国
に送られたというものであった。 7月15日より中共代表として周恩来も
国防会議に参加しており，蒋介石としてはまず対内的に日本に屈服した
という印象は絶対に避けねばならなかったのである。それゆえ， 7月17日
に蒋介石は虚山にて「最後の関頭」演説を行なったが，その時点でこれ
は日本政府に向けられたものではなし公表されたのは19日になってか
らであった。
第五に，以上の様な情報に鑑み，日本政府の相互撤退案は蒋介石にと
り受入れ難いものであった。しかし蒋介石個人としては，現地協定を認
めるつもりではあったが，南京で交渉にあたっていた董道寧はこのニュ
アンスを日高参事官に伝えることが出来なかった。また王寵恵外交部長
は親英米派でもあり，交渉をまとめる努力は窺えなかった。それゆえ，
日高参事官は，中国側に交渉する意志なしとの旨を中央に伝えたのであ
る。
以上が，この時期に見られた主な特徴である。石原作戦部長は依然と
して内地動員に反対であり，杉山陸相や梅津陸軍次官に中国との直接交
渉を近衛首相や広田外相にやらせては，と説得にあたったが，両者を納
得させるのに十分な理由を持ち合わせてはいなかった。つまり，閣議の
様子から判断して，首相や外相には蒋介石との直接交渉の自信なしと見
倣されていたのである。加うるに，北支軍の兵力展開という組織ルーティ
ーンの面と，一文字山への中国軍の射撃および上記の日高参事官の情報
により， 7月20日に第二次内地動員が決定されることになったのである。
